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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to provide perceptual scientists with a quantitative framework
for modeling a variety of common perceptual behaviors, and to unify various perceptual in-
ference tasks by exposing their common computational underpinnings. This paper derives a
model Bayesian observer for perceptual contexts with linear Gaussian generative processes.
I demonstrate the relationship between four fundamental perceptual situations by expressing
their corresponding posterior distributions as consequences of the model's predictions under
their respective assumptions.
1 Introduction
Perception is the process of inferring scene properties that cannot be directly observed from the
observable sensory evidence they generate. There is substantial regularity in the structure of scenes
in the world, and sensations are generated by a consistent, yet noisy, process; modeling perception
as Bayesian inference is attractive because it oﬀers principled, normative behavioral predictions
for perceptual tasks in this type of structured, uncertain world. Scientists compare these predic-
tions with experimental measurements to reveal an organism's internal computational procedures
responsible for its perceptually-guided behaviors.
However formulating and evaluating Bayesian perception models can be daunting due to their
mathematical complexities and algorithmic subtleties. This report aims to increase perception
scientists' access to Bayesian modeling by presenting a powerful class of models (linear Gaussian)
that naturally encompass an important range of perceptual phenomena. These models are easy to
construct, and can make exact, interpretable predictions.
Linear Gaussian models apply to perceptual situations in which the scene properties are apri-
ori Gaussian-distributed, and generate sensory evidence by a linear process corrupted by Gaussian
noise. They can also apply to log-Gaussian prior and noise distributions, with log-linear (multi-
plicative/divisive) sensory generative processes, and may be extended to more complicated genera-
tive processes for which Taylor series expansions provide good approximations. In practice, linear
Gaussian models can be applied to many common sensation/perception situations, like spatial
localization, temporal perception, size, lightness, and color constancy, and many others.
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Section 2 presents the abstract linear Gaussian model and a deriviation of the posterior dis-
tribution over unobserved variables given observed variables. Section 3 tailors the framework to
modeling four qualitatively-distinct, elementary perceptual situations [10]. Section 4 brieﬂy outlines
a decision-making framework compatible with the perceptual inference framework.
2 Linear Gaussian Model
This section presents the linear Gaussian model, and derives the posterior inference formulae. The
derivation is based on general linear algebra rules, properties of Gaussians, and is examined in
greater depth by [13].
2.1 Derivation of posterior for linear Gaussian model
Consider latent random vector, L, that generates observable data vector, D, as:
D = GL+ Ω
where G is a matrix that represents the deterministic component of the observation transform, Ω
represents zero-mean (0), additive observation noise, and N (X;Y,Z) is a normal distribution over
X, with mean vector Y , and covariance matrix Z. Assume L and Ω have normal prior distributions,
Pr(L) = N (L;µL,ΣL)
Pr(Ω) = N (Ω;0,ΣΩ)
By rules for linear transformations between normal random variables, the conditional and marginal
likelihoods of the data are,
Pr(D | L) = N (D;GL,ΣΩ)
Pr(D) = N (D;GµL, GΣLGT + ΣΩ)
Reformulating the conditional likelihood as an unnormalized distribution over L gives,
Pr(D | L) = c · N
(
L;
(
GTΣ−1Ω G
)−1
GTΣ−1Ω D,
(
GTΣ−1Ω G
)−1)
where c is a constant.
The joint distribution over L and D can be factored:
Pr(L,D) = Pr(D | L)Pr(L)
and Bayes' theorem deﬁnes the posterior:
Pr(L | D) = Pr(D | L)Pr(L)
Pr(D)
=
c · k
Pr(D)
N (L;µpost,Σpost)
2
where k and Pr(D) are constants (µpost and Σpost are deﬁned next).
Because Pr(L | D) and N (L;µpost,Σpost) are both densities, constant c·kPr(D) must equal 1. So,
Pr(L | D) = N (L;µpost,Σpost)
Σpost =
(
GTΣ−1Ω G+ Σ
−1
L
)−1
µpost = Σpost
(
GTΣ−1Ω D + Σ
−1
L µL
)
=
(
GTΣ−1Ω G+ Σ
−1
L
)−1
GTΣ−1Ω D +
(
GTΣ−1Ω G+ Σ
−1
L
)−1
Σ−1L µL
If the posterior over only a subset of the elements of L is desired, because the posterior is normal
the undesired latent elements can be easily marginalized out by deleting their corresponding rows
(and columns) from µpost and Σpost.
3 Application to perceptual inference
This section considers several elementary perceptual situations, characterized by Kersten et al.
(2004) [10] (Figure 4), by deﬁning their generative processes under linear Gaussian assumptions,
and their corresponding posterior inference rules. In each case, there are between 1 and 2 latent and
data elements, but this can be extended arbitrarily by adding elements to the L and D vectors, and
their respective parameter vectors/matrices. After each application, several references are provided
in which the authors explicitly or implicitly use some form of the model.
3.1 Basic Bayes
Consider an observer who wishes to infer latent scene property L = l from observed sensory data
D = d, with G = g, Ω = ω, µL = µl, ΣL = σ
2
l , and ΣΩ = σ
2
ω.
The posterior over L given D is:
Pr(L | D) = N (L;µpost,Σpost)
Σpost =
(
g2
σ2ω
+
1
σ2l
)−1
=
σ2ωσ
2
l
g2σ2l + σ
2
ω
µpost =
(
g2
σ2ω
+
1
σ2l
)−1(
dg
σ2ω
+
µl
σ2l
)
=
dgσ2l + µlσ
2
ω
g2σ2l + σ
2
ω
This model was used by [19] for modeling motion perception.
Using the common assumptions that g = 1 and σ2l →∞ results in a simple perceptual inference
rule,
Pr(L | D) = N (L;µpost,Σpost) = N
(
l; d, σ2ω
)
This special case has been used implicitly by too many authors to name, in a very broad number
of perception studies.
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3.2 Cue combination
Consider an observer who wishes to infer latent scene property L = l from two pieces of observed sen-
sory data D =
[
d1
d2
]
, with G =
[
g1
g2
]
, Ω =
[
ω1
ω2
]
, µL = µl, ΣL = σ
2
l , and ΣΩ =
[
σ2ω1 0
0 σ2ω2
]
.
The posterior over L given D is:
Pr(L | D) = N (L;µpost,Σpost)
Σpost =
(
g21
σ2ω1
+
g22
σ2ω2
+
1
σ2l
)−1
=
σ2ω1σ
2
ω2σ
2
l
g21σ
2
ω2σ
2
l + g
2
2σ
2
ω1σ
2
l + σ
2
ω1σ
2
ω2
µpost =
(
g21
σ2ω1
+
g22
σ2ω2
+
1
σ2l
)−1(
d1g
2
1
σ2ω1
+
d2g
2
2
σ2ω2
+
µl
σ2l
)
=
d1g
2
1σ
2
ω2σ
2
l
g21σ
2
ω2σ
2
l + g
2
2σ
2
ω1σ
2
l + σ
2
ω1σ
2
ω2
+
d2g
2
2σ
2
ω1σ
2
l
g21σ
2
ω2σ
2
l + g
2
2σ
2
ω1σ
2
l + σ
2
ω1σ
2
ω2
+
µlσ
2
ω1σ
2
ω2
g21σ
2
ω2σ
2
l + g
2
2σ
2
ω1σ
2
l + σ
2
ω1σ
2
ω2
Using the common assumptions that g1 = g2 = 1 and σ
2
l → ∞ results in a simple perceptual
inference rule,
Pr(L | D) = N (L;µpost,Σpost) = N
(
l;
d1σ
2
ω2 + d2σ
2
ω1
σ2ω1 + σ
2
ω2
,
σ2ω1σ
2
ω2
σ2ω1 + σ
2
ω2
)
This model was used by [9, 20, 7, 4, 2, 12, 8] and many more for modeling human cue integration.
3.3 Discounting
Consider an observer who wishes to infer latent scene properties L =
[
l1
l2
]
, from observed sensory
data D = d, with G =
[
g1 g2
]
, Ω = ω, µL =
[
µl1
µl2
]
, ΣL =
[
σ2l1 0
0 σ2l2
]
, and ΣΩ = σ
2
ω.
The posterior over L given D is:
Pr(L | D) = N (L;µpost,Σpost)
Σpost =
 g21σ2ω + 1σ2l1 g1g2σ2ω
g1g2
σ2ω
g22
σ2ω
+ 1
σ2l2
−1
µpost =
 g21σ2ω + 1σ2l1 g1g2σ2ω
g1g2
σ2ω
g22
σ2ω
+ 1
σ2l2
−1  dg1σ2ω + µl1σ2l1
dg2
σ2ω
+
µl2
σ2l2

Using the common assumptions that g1 = 1 and σ
2
l1
→∞,
Pr(L | D) = N (L;µpost,Σpost) = N
(
L;
[
d− µl2g2
µl2
]
,
[
g22σ
2
l2
+ σ2ω −g2σ2l2−g2σ2l2 σ2l2
])
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If only l1 is relevant to the observer (i.e. l2 is a nuisance variable), then,
Pr(l1 | D) = N (l1;µpost,Σpost) = N
(
l1; d− µl2g2, g22σ2l2 + σ2ω
)
This model was implicitly used by [17, 16, 1], and many more, and can explain a variety of
human perceptual biases.
3.4 Explaining away
Consider an observer who wishes to infer latent scene properties L =
[
l1
l2
]
, from observed sensory
data D =
[
d1
d2
]
, with G =
[
g1,1 g1,2
0 g2,2
]
, Ω =
[
ω1
ω2
]
, µL =
[
µl1
µl2
]
, ΣL =
[
σ2l1 0
0 σ2l2
]
, and
ΣΩ =
[
σ2ω1 0
0 σ2ω2
]
.
The posterior over L given D is:
Pr(L | D) = N (L;µpost,Σpost)
Σpost =
 g21,1σ2ω1 + 1σ2l1 g1,1g1,2σ2ω1
g1,1g1,2
σ2ω1
g21,2
σ2ω1
+
g22,2
σ2ω2
+ 1
σ2l2
−1
µpost =
 g21,1σ2ω1 + 1σ2l1 g1,1g1,2σ2ω1
g1,1g1,2
σ2ω1
g21,2
σ2ω1
+
g22,2
σ2ω2
+ 1
σ2l2
−1  d1g1,1σ2ω1 + µl1σ2l1
d1g1,2
σ2ω1
+
d2g2,2
σ2ω2
+
µl2
σ2l2

Using the common assumptions that g1,1 = g2,2 = 1, σ
2
l1
→∞, and σ2l2 →∞,
Pr(L | D) = N (L;µpost,Σpost) = N
(
L;
[
d1 − d2g1,2
d2
]
,
[
g21,2σ
2
ω2 + σ
2
ω1 −g1,2σ2ω2
−g1,2σ2ω2 σ2ω2
])
If only l1 is relevant to the observer (i.e. l2 is a nuisance variable), then,
Pr(l1 | D) = N (l1;µpost,Σpost) = N
(
l1; d1 − d2g1,2, g21,2σ2ω2 + σ2ω1
)
A slightly more general assumption is that g1,1 = g2,2 = 1, σ
2
l1
→∞ (σ2l2 remains ﬁnite),
Pr(L | D) = N (L;µpost,Σpost)
Σpost =
1
σ2l2 + σ
2
ω2
[
g21,2σ
2
l2
σ2ω2 + σ
2
l2
σ2ω1 + σ
2
ω1σ
2
ω2 −g1,2σ2l2σ2ω2−g1,2σ2l2σ2ω2 σ2l2σ2ω2
]
µpost =
 d1 − d2g1,2σ
2
l2
σ2l2
+σ2ω2
− µl2g1,2σ
2
ω2
σ2l2
+σ2ω2
d2g1,2σ
2
l2
σ2l2
+σ2ω2
+
µl2g1,2σ
2
ω2
σ2l2
+σ2ω2

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If only l1 is relevant to the observer (i.e. l2 is a nuisance variable), then,
Pr(l1 | D) = N (l1;µpost,Σpost) = N
(
l1; d1 −
d2g1,2σ
2
l2
+ µl2g1,2σ
2
ω2
σ2l2 + σ
2
ω2
,
g21,2σ
2
l2
σ2ω2 + σ
2
l2
σ2ω1 + σ
2
ω1σ
2
ω2
σ2l2 + σ
2
ω2
)
This model was used by [5, 3, 6, 11], and can be applied to the broad class of perceptual
constancy phenomena.
4 Perceptual decision-making
This section brieﬂy outlines Bayesian decision theory, and how to apply the inference rules from
Section 3 to make perceptual judgments. For a detailed treatment of Bayesian perceptual decision-
making, see [14, 15].
4.1 Bayesian decision theory
Bayesian decision theory (BDT) prescribes optimal decision-making based on inferred posterior
distributions over the state of the world. BDT deﬁnes a risk function, R(α,D), that represents
the expected reward (negative loss) for diﬀerent combinations of data D and actions α. The
risk function is an expectation over the observer's rewards, characterized by the reward (negative
loss) function Λ(α,L), under the information inferred about the environment, characterized by the
posterior Pr(L | D),
R(α,D) =
ˆ
L
Λ(α,L)Pr(L | D)dL
Optimal agents select actions with maximal expected reward by computing α˜ = arg maxα R(α,D).
Sometimes random components, ν, are included to characterize the eﬀects of motor noise, decision
noise, etc., αˆ = α˜+ ν.
In normal psychophysical experiments, participants are typically asked to respond with an
indication of the L state, so the space of α is either equivalent to the L space, or some straightforward
function of it, f(·). In some cases they are assumed to place low, identical reward across all incorrect
answers, and greater, identical reward across all correct answers:
Λ(α,L) =
{
b ;α = f(L¯)
c ;α 6= f(L¯)
where L¯ is the true latent world state and b c.
For standard discrimination tasks, f(·) may be:
f(L) =
{
0 ; lr ≤ θ
1 ; lr > θ
where lr is an element of the latent state relevant to the task and θ is some threshold value (e.g. lr
represents absence/presence, 0/1, of an auditory tone and θ is 0).
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For tasks that ask participants to produce a response, α, on some continuous axis, i.e. pointing,
grasping, etc., f(·) may deﬁne a range, [−θ, θ], that constitutes success:
f(L) =
{
1 ;−θ ≤ lr ≤ θ
0 ; otherwise
In work from the cognitive psychology domain and more recent perceptual studies [21], it has
been suggested that humans sample from their posterior distributions, rather than computing de-
terministic functions of the distribution, to produce responses. Also, in some cases the perceptual
inference process may appear to depend on the task [18].
5 Conclusion
The beneﬁts of a Bayesian framework for modeling perceptually-guided behaviors is that it explains
these behaviors as resulting from a principled inferential process, based on sensory input and the
observer's perceptual system's internal knowledge and beliefs, which is used rationally to acquire
reward and avoid penalty. The linear Gaussian model and its example applications provide an
accessible and useful model that can be used to model a broad set of perceptual behaviors. It may
help explain various cue integration, bias, constancy phenomena.
The problem of using this framework to design an experiment and analyze the resultant data is
beyond the scope of this article, but is an important element for leveraging this framework on typ-
ical perceptual science problems. In brief, by treating the experimental stimuli as L (Section 2.1),
and the recorded participant responses as αˆ (Section 4.1), the model parameters, (G,µL,ΣL,ΣΩν),
which encode the experimenter's hypotheses and assumptions about the observer's perceptual rea-
soning, can be estimated or inferred using standard statistical methods.
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